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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we investigate trade pattern in a general equilibrium
model of monopolistic competition with transaction costs in comparison with the four core
theorems, the Heckscher-Olin (HO) theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem, the
Rybczynski (RY) theorem, and factor price equalization (FPE) theorem in the HO model.
Second, we introduce differences in transaction conditions between countries into the model of
monopolistic competition to investigate interplay between trade patterns and development
strategies. Let us motivate the two tasks one by one.
According to Trefler (1995), the HO theorem is consistent with empirical findings only
50% of the time. Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) show that the specific factor model captures
reality more closely than the SS theorem for many U.S. industries.1
There are several lines of research that might accommodate the new empirical evidences.
Leontief (1953) suggested to introduce technological differences between countries into the HO
model to accommodate observations. Trefler (1995) demonstrated empirically that a
modification is desirable that allows for consumption bias and technology difference between
countries. Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994, pp.39, 42) indicate that the assumptions of the SS and
FPE theorems remain so extraordinarily demanding that they cannot be taken seriously as the
major theoretical construct justifying fears in industrial countries that trade with developing
countries will undermine the wages of unskilled labor. They note that considerable analytical
work was devoted to showing why FPE seemed to be frustrated in reality. They suggest three
ways to invalidate the SS theorem and FPE theorem. One is to consider the equilibrium that
occurs outside of the diversification cone and discontinuous jumps of equilibrium between
different patterns of specialization. Another is to consider the CES production function. In the
face of a sufficiently large shift in relative factor prices, goods could switch over from being
intensive in one factor to being intensive in the other (factor reversal). Finally, scale economies
could be another reason for de facto differences in technology and, in particular, could invalidate
2the SS theorem, causing both factors real wages to rise (p. 44) as scale efficiencies from trade
swamp adverse effects on the scarce factor.
Cheng, Sachs, and Yang (1998) introduce differences in technology and in transaction
conditions between the countries into the HO model and conduct inframarginal analysis of jumps
of equilibrium between various patterns of specialization to confirm these suggestions.
Panagariya (1983), Kemp (1991), Young (1991), and others introduce variable returns to scale to
refine the core theorems. Helpman and Krugman (1985) explore effects of economies of scale
and monopolistic competition on trade pattern. For instance, Helpman (1987) shows that when
economies become more similar in size, world trade increases. However, because of symmetry in
their models, it is indeterminate which country exports which goods in equilibrium.
In the Ricardo model of exogenous comparative advantage (see Dixit and Norman,
1980), trade pattern is explained by exogenous comparative advantage in technologies. Here,
exogenous comparative advantages come from ex ante differences between agents before they
have made decisions. In the literature of endogenous specialization (see Yang and Ng, 1998 for a
recent survey of this literature and references there), trade pattern is explained by endogenous
comparative advantage. Endogenous comparative advantage comes from increasing returns. It
may exist between ex ante identical agents. Individuals trade those goods which have greater
economies of specialization, better transaction condition, and/or are more desirable if not all
goods are traded (see Yang, 1991). But who sells which good is indeterminate in the models of
endogenous specialization because of the assumption that all individuals are ex ante identical.
The current paper shall investigate the implications of coexistence of endogenous and exogenous
comparative advantage and transaction costs for economic development and trade.
Puga and Venables (1998) introduce difference in endowment between countries into the
model of monopolistic competition. But as they come to comparative statics of equilibrium, the
difference is assumed away. In the current paper, we introduce difference in transaction and
production conditions between countries into the model of monopolistic competition to
investigate pattern of trade in the model of monopolistic competition in comparison with
neoclassical core trade theorems in the HO model. Our purpose is not only checking under what
conditions the core theorems hold (or do not hold), but also investigating effects of changes in
framework on changes of the meanings of the concepts, such as factor intensity and gains from
trade. As the meanings of the concepts change in response to changes in model structure,
3relevance of empirical evidence that is obtained on the basis of the neoclassical framework to the
framework of monopolistic competition may be in question.
As Albert Einstein stated (quoted in Heisenberg, 1971, p. 31), "It is quite wrong to try
founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. … It is the theory which decides what we can
observe." For instance, many economists take the notion of capital as granted. But its meaning in
the model of endogenous number of intermediate (capital) goods is totally different from that in
a neoclassical HO model. As the number of capital goods that are employed to produce a final
good increases in response to improvements in transaction conditions, the equilibrium input level
of capital and capital intensity increase even if production conditions, tastes, and equilibrium
prices are not changed. Hence, in a model of monopolistic competition, outsourcing,
disintegration, and variety of goods might be better concepts than the notion of capital to capture
the essence of comparative statics of equilibrium. Hence, data sets that are designed according to
the new concepts might be more appropriate for testing the new theory.
Many new models of monopolistic competition with transaction costs are used to analyze
trade and development phenomena. For instance Krugman and Venables (1995) analyze
industrialization and income distribution, Fujita and Krugman (1995) analyze urbanization by
introducing difference of transaction conditions between industrial and agricultural sectors into
the model of monopolistic competition. Puga and Venables (1998) analyze import substitution
and geographical concentration of industrial production. As the essence of comparative statics of
equilibrium in this kind of models is increasingly more appreciated, we can see that many
conventional notions, such as import substitution, become out-of-date. Rethinking of the
relationship between trade pattern and economic development pattern is needed.1
Hence, the second purpose of the current paper is to investigate the intrplay between
trade pattern and development pattern in a model of monopolistic competition. Feenstra (1998)
reviews empirical evidences for the relationship between increases in trade of intermediate inputs
and economic development. He points out that the distinction between effects of trade and
effects of technological changes on income distribution becomes suspect if we consider
                                                          
1 Another example of interdependence between notions and framework that are used relates to the concepts of
skilled versus unskilled workers. In a model of endogenous variety of intermediate goods, this distinction can be
replaced with difference in the number of professional sectors. An increase in variety of occupations implies that
more professional workers are available, which is equivalent to an increase of skilled workers. Allyn Young (1928)
called this variety of professional occupations "qualitative aspect of division of labor." He referred to economies of
scale as "quantitative aspect of division of labor."
4equilibrium comparative statics in a model of endogenous number of intermediate goods. As
transaction conditions are improved (due to new communication and transacting technology) the
number of intermediate goods increases, final goods become more "capital intensive," and
outsourcing trade increases. Our general equilibrium comparative statics in the framework of
monopolistic competition will assist clarifying the discussion in which vague logic and
inaccurate terms are sometimes used.
As we introduce exogenous comparative advantage in production (based on ex ante
differences in production conditions between countries) and exogenous comparative advantage
in transactions (based on ex ante differences in transaction conditions between countries) into the
model with monopolistic competition and endogenous comparative advantage (based on
economies of scale), we can show that a country may export goods in which it has exogenous
comparative disadvantage in production if its endogenous comparative advantages in production
and exogenous comparative advantage in transactions outweigh its exogenous comparative
disadvantage. Also, final manufactured goods may become increasingly more capital intensive,
as the number of capital goods increases in response to parameter changes. A country can export
capital intensive goods even if it has exogenous comparative disadvantage in producing this
good.
Our model will show that a country will trade goods in which it has net comprehensive
exogenous and endogenous comparative advantage in production as well as in transactions. It
will exploit substitution between trades of different types of goods to avoid trade that involves
high transaction costs. Various possible substitutions between endogenous and exogenous
comparative advantages and between comparative advantages in production and in transactions
generate much more colorful picture of equilibrium trade and development patterns than in
neoclassical trade models.
Section 2 specifies the model, identifies possible trade patterns, and solves for local
equilibrium in each trade pattern. Section 3 conducts inframarginal analysis across different trade
patterns and identifies parameter subspaces within each of which a local equilibrium is the
general equilibrium. In section 4, our results are compared with conventional wisdom in
neoclassical theories of trade and economic development. Final section concludes the paper.
52. The Model and Local Equilibria and Marginal Comparative Statics in Various Trade
Structures
Consider two countries. Population size in country i is Mi. Migration between countries is
prohibitively expensive. Agricultural good z is produced from labor. Industrial good y is
produced from labor and n i termediate goods.
2.1. A consumer's decision
A representative consumer's decision problem in country i is
(1) Max:  ui = (yi + kiyji)
a (zi +kizji)
1-a s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
 + pizzi + pjzzji
 = wi
where ui is a consumer's utility level in country i, yi and zi are the respective quantities of the
manufactured consumption good (such as car) and the agricultural good (such as food), purchased
from the domestic market in country i. yji
 and zji
 are the respective quantities of the two goods
imported by an individual in country i from the other country. pis
 is the price of good s in country i.
It is assumed that each individual is endowed with one unit labor, and labor in country 1 is the
numeraire, so that w1 = 1 and w2 = w. Iceberg transaction cost is assumed, so that 1-ki Î [0, 1] is
the transaction cost coefficient and ki the transaction efficiency coefficient for importing one unit
of final consumption goods in country i.
2.2. Possible Trade Structures
As we introduce the ex ante differences in transaction conditions between the two countries into
the model, corner solutions are possible. Hence, standard marginal analysis for interior solutions
does not work. We need a little bit of innovation of analytical method. We first apply the Kuhn-
Tucker condition to identify the conditions under which a particular trade structure occurs in
equilibrium. These conditions are dependent on relative prices. Second, for a given structure, we
solve for a local equilibrium using marginal analysis. We can plug the equilibrium prices into the
conditions identified in the first step. We can then partition parameter space into subspaces
within each of which a particular structure occurs in equilibrium. This is called inframarginal
analysis.
Let us take the first step in the inframarginal analysis. The Kuhn-Tucker condition for the
two representative consumers' decision problems in the two countries indicates that some trade
6structures never occur in equilibrium and that each of the feasible trade structures occurs in
equilibrium only if relative prices and relative transaction condition in the two countries satisfy a
certain condition. Later, we can obtain similar result for trade pattern of intermediate goods using
the Kuhn-Tucker condition for the decision of a firm producing the final manufactured good.
The two sets of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield the following conditions for a certain trade
pattern to occur in equilibrium, where xi is th  amount of an intermediate good purchased from
the domestic market in country i, xji is the amount of an intermediate good imported from country
j to country i, and ti is the transaction efficiency coefficient of importing intermediate goods in
country i.
(2)
(A) If k1 and t1 and/or k2 and t2 are sufficiently small, the optimum decision requires that zji = xji =
yji = 0 and xi, yi, zi >0, which implies that no trade occurs between the countries or autarky
structure, shown in Fig. 1(a), occurs in equilibrium.
(C1) For p1y/p2y <k2 and p1z/p2z >1/k1, the optimum decision requires z12 = x12 = y21 = z1 = y2 = 0
and x1, y1, z2, x21, z21, y12 >0. This structure of trade (C1) is shown in Fig. 1(c).
(C2) For p1y/p2y > 1/k1 and p1z/p2z < k2, the optimum decision requires z21 = x21 = y12 = z2 = y1 = 0
and x2, y2, z1, x12, z12, y21>0. This structure of trade C2 is symmetric to C1.
(D0) For p1y/p2y Î(k2, 1/k1) and p1z/p2z Î(k2, 1/k1), the optimum decision requires z12 = y12 = z21 =
y21 = 0 and x1, y1, z1, x2, y2,  z2, x12, x21 > 0. This structure of trade (D0) is shown in Fig. 1(d).
(D1) For p1y/p2y Î(k2, 1/k1) and p1z/p2z < k2, the optimum decision requires y12 = z21 = y21 = z2 = 0
and x1, y1, z1, x2, y2, x12, x21, z12 > 0. This structure of trade is called D1.
(D2) For p1y/p2y Î(k2, 1/k1) and p1z/p2z > 1/k1, the optimum decision requires y21 = z12 = y12 = z1 =
0 and x2, y2, z2, x1, y1, x21, x12, z21 > 0. This structure of trade D2 is symmetric to D1.
(E1) For p1y/p2y <k2 and p1z/p2z Î(k2, 1/k1), the optimum decision requires x12 = z12 = y21 = z21 = x2
= y2 = 0 and x1, y1, z1, x21, y12, z2 > 0..This trade structure is called E1, shown in panel (e).
(E2) For p1y/p2y > 1/k1 and p1z/p2z Î(k2, 1/k1), the optimum decision requires x21 = z21 = y12 = z12 =
x1 = y1 = 0 and x2, y2, z2, x12, y21, z1 > 0. This trade structure E2 is symmetric to E1.
(F1) For p1y/p2y <k2 and p1z/p2z < k2, the optimum decision requires x12 = y21 = z21 = x2 = z2 = y2 = 0
and x1, y1, z1, x21, y12, z12 > 0. This trade structure is called F1, shown in panel (f).
7(F2) For p1y/p2y > 1/k1 and p1z/p2z > 1/k1, the optimum decision requires x21 = y12 = z12 = x1 = z1 =
y1 = 0 and x2, y2, z2, x12, y21, z21 > 0. This trade structure is called F2.
(a) Structure A (autarky)(b) A structure that does not occur in equilibrium
(c) Structure C1 (d) Structure D0
(e) Structure E1 (f) Structure F1
Figure 1: Different Patterns of Development and Trade
Also, it can be shown that a pattern of trade in panel (b) and other trade structures do not occur in
equilibrium except for some razor edge cases where some of the inequalities involving relative
prices in (2) become equalities.2 Th  markets for goods y and z are competitive because of
constant returns to scale in production. But the market for intermediate goods is monopolistically
competitive.
                                                          
2 The complete partition of the parameter space when the razor edge cases are considered can be obtained from the
authors upon request.
82.3. Production of agricultural good z
The production function of food in country i is
Zi = qiLiz
where Zi is the output level of z, and Liz is the amount of labor allocated to the production of food
in country i. For simplicity, we assume that q2 =1 nd q1 = q > 1. This implies that country 1 has
exogenous comparative advantage in producing food, since in the next two subsections the
production function of industrial goods y and x is assumed same for the two countries.
2.4. Production of final manufactured good y





where Yi is output level of good y produced by a representative firm in country i, ni a d n-ni are the
respective numbers of intermediate goods purchased by country i from domestic market and from
the other country, xi is the amount of an intermediate good purchased by the firm in country i from
domestic market to produce good y, xji is that purchased by the firm in country i from the other
country, and ti is the transaction efficiency coefficient for country i importing intermediate good
from the other country. x can be considered as all kinds of professional machine tools, and the
elasticity of substitution 1/(1-r) is assumed to be larger than one, that is rÎ(0,1). We have used the
symmetry and omit index of intermediate goods when no confusion is caused.
2.5. Production of intermediate goods
The production function for the monopolist producer of an intermediate good in country i is
Xi = (Li-a)/b,
where Xi is the quantity of an intermediate good supplied by the monopolist in country i and Li is
the amount of labor hired by the firm to produce the intermediate good. Again, we have used the
symmetry and omit index of intermediate goods when no confusion is caused.
As shown in (2), ten market structures may occur in equilibrium in this model. We consider
the local equilibrium in each of them.
92.6. Local equilibrium in structure A
We first consider structure A where xi, yi, zi > 0, xij = yij
 = zij = 0. A consumer's decision yields
demand functions for goods y and z. Each consumer supplies one unit of labor and total supply of
labor in country i is Mi. The zero profit condition for the firm producing z gives the price of good z
in terms of labor in country i piz, The symmetry implies that quantities supplied or employed are
the same for ni intermediate goods. The zero profit condition and a first order condition for the
decision problem of the firm producing y yields the equilibrium relative quantity of labor and
intermediate goods and an equation that determines the equilibrium piy/pix. Using the production
and demand functions of y, the market clearing conditions for y and labor, and the first order
conditions for the decision problem of the firm producing y, we can find the demand function for
x. Using the Dixit-Stiglitz formula for own price elasticity E = 1/(1-r), we can then work out the
first order condition for the decision problem for the monopolist producer of an intermediate good.
Then the zero profit condition for this firm yields the equilibrium ni. The local equilibrium and its
marginal comparative statics in this structure is summarized as follows.
wi = 1,p1z = 1/q, p2z = 1, pix =b/r,
piy = (1-b)b-1[a/(1-r)b]b/r [(1-r)b/ra]b (aMi)b (1-1/r),
ni = Miba(1-r)/a,
u1 = [q(1-a)](1-a)aap1y-a, u2 = (1-a)(1-a)aap2y-a,
dpiy/dMi < 0, dni/dMi > 0, dui/dMi > 0.
where i = 1, 2. The marginal comparative statics imply that as the population in an integrated
market increases, the equilibrium price of final manufactured good decreases and the equilibrium
number of intermediate goods and per capita real income increase. Since total factor productivity
of the final manufactured good is an increasing function of the number of intermediate goods, this
productivity increases with population size too. Ethier (1980) uses this result to show that the
opening up of international trade can increase the population size in an integrated world market.
This enlarges the scope for trading off economies of scale against productivity gains from more
variety of intermediate goods and therefore generates gains from trade.
2.7. Local equilibrium in structure C
Next, we consider structure C1 where x1, y1, z2, y12, x21 > 0, x12 = y21
 = z12 = 0. The procedure to
solve the corner equilibrium in this structure is the same as that for structure A except that the
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markets for x, y, z are jointly cleared for both countries. The corner equilibrium in this structure is
summarized as follows.
w = t1
r, p1z = 1/q, p2z = t1r, p1x =b/r, p2x = t1rb/r,
p1y = (1-b)b-1b-b/r (b/r)b [(1-r)a(M1+ k1rM2)/a] b (1-1/r),
n1 = [(1-r)/a][M1(ba+1-a)-a(1-b)t1rM2],
n2 = [(1-r)/a][M2a-(1-a)t1-rM1],
u1 = B(qk1)1-at1-r(1-a)(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/r, u2 = Bt1rak2a(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/r,
where B º (1-a)(1-a)aa [(1-b)1-bbb/r(r/b)b]a[a(1-r)/a]ab(1-r)/r. The differentiation of the solutions
yields marginal comparative statics of the local equilibrium in structure C1.
(3) dni/dMi > 0, dni/dMj < 0, dn2/dt1 > 0, dn1/dt1 < 0,
dn/dt1 > 0, if (1-a)M1/a(1-b)M2 > t12r,
dn/dM1 > 0 iff t1>[(1-a)/ab+1-a]1/r, dn/dM2 > 0,
dw/dt1 > 0, dui/dMj > 0, dui/dki > 0, dui/dt1 > 0.
where i, j = 1, 2 and n = n1 + n2 is the number of all intermediate goods available in the two
countries. The marginal comparative statics of the local equilibrium imply that as the transaction
condition in country 1 improves, the production of intermediate goods will shift from country 1 to
country 2. This relocation of industrial production increase utility levels in the two countries
although the nominal income in country 1 relative to that in country 2 increases as well. The
improvement of the transaction condition in country 2 has no effects on industrial structure and
location of industrial production, though it increases utility of each individual in country 2. An
increase in the population size in country 1 will shift the production of producer goods from
country 2 to country 1. But an increase in the population size in country 2 has opposite effect on
location of industrial production. However, the increase in population size in either country will
raise per capita real income in both countries.
As n1 or n2 tends to zero, the production of all intermediate goods becomes concentrated in
country 2 or 1. A careful examination of the equilibrium solutions yields the following conditions
for such concentration.
(4) n1 = n and n2 = 0 if t1 < ta º [M1(1-a)/M2a]1/r
n1, n2 Î (0, n) if t1 Î (ta, tb), where  tb º [M1(ab+1-a)/M2a(1-r)]1/r
n2 = n and n1 = 0 if t1 > tb,
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where ta< tb always holds. The marginal comparative statics of the local equilibrium in structure C1
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1:
If the transaction efficiency of intermediate goods is very low in country 1, country 2 specializes in
producing the agricultural good in the absence of industrialization. The production of all final and
intermediate manufactured goods is located in country 1. As the transaction condition is improved
in country 1, country 2 starts industrialization which relocates the production of intermediate goods
from country 1 to country 2. The smaller the population size of country 1 relative to country 2, the
faster is the relocation process. Per capita real incomes in both countries increase as a result of the
relocation, although wage rate in country 2 increases compared to that in country 1. The wage
difference between the two countries converges to 0 as transaction cost tends to 0. The per capita
real income in country 1 is more likely to be higher than in country 2, the greater the income share
of the final manufactured good, the greater the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
goods, and/or the higher the relative transaction efficiency of country 1 to country 2. An increase in
the population size of a country will move the production of intermediate goods to this country
from the other country, increasing per capita real income in this country.
The local equilibrium in structure C2 is symmetric to that in C1. Hence, a similar proposition can
be obtained from the comparative statics of that local equilibrium.
2.8. Local equilibrium in structure D
We now consider structure D0 in which country 1 produces final goods y and z and n1 intermediate
goods. It exchanges the intermediate goods for n2 intermediate goods produced by country 2 which
self-provides goods y and z as well. Hence, for this structure we have xi, yi, zi, xij > 0,  yij
 = zij = 0.
The local equilibrium in this structure is summarized as follows.























u1 = [q(1-a)]1-aaap1y-a, u2 = (1-a)1-aaa (p2y/w)-a.
where A º (1-b)b-1ab[a/(1-r)b]b/r[(1-r)b/ar]b. The market clearing conditions for intermediate




-r always holds. It is obvious that w converges to 1 as t1 nd t2 tend to 1.
The differentiation of the solutions yields:
dw/dt1 = -(¶f/¶ t1)/(¶f/¶w) > 0, dw/dt2 = -(¶f/¶ t2)/(¶f/¶w) < 0,
where ¶f/¶t1 > 0, ¶f/¶t2 < 0, ¶f/¶w < 0. The result implies that relative per capital nominal income
of country 2 to country 1 increases as the transaction condition in country 1 improves or as the
transaction condition in country 2 worsens.
Similar results can be obtained for the relationship between per capita real income in a
country and the transaction conditions in the two countries. It can be shown that
(5a) du1/dt1 = (¶u1/¶t1)+(¶u1/¶w)(dw/dt1) < 0,
du2/dt2 = (¶u2/¶t2)+(¶u2/¶w)(dw/dt2) < 0,
where dw/dt1 > 0, dw/dt2 < 0, ¶u1/¶w < 0, ¶u2/¶w > 0, ¶u1/¶ t1 < 0, ¶u1/¶t2 < 0, ¶u2/¶t2 < 0.
Other marginal comparative statics in this structure are
(5b) dui/dMi > 0, dui/dMj > 0, dni/dMi > 0, dni/dr < 0, dni/da < 0.
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for a producer of good y indicates that the first order derivative
of profit with respect to quantity of an imported intermediate good is always negative if the
transaction efficiency coefficient is zero in this country. Hence, the equilibrium will jump to
another structure if t is sufficiently close to 0 in either country.
If 1-ti is interpreted as the import tariff rate in country i and all tariff revenue is exhausted
by bureaucrats who collect it, then the marginal comparative statics in (5) imply that each country
has an incentive to impose tariff which increases per capita real income in the home country.
Proposition 2:
As the population size in either country or import tariff rate increases in a country, the per capita
real income in this country increases. Also, the number of intermediate goods produced in a
country increases with its population size. Wage difference between the two countries converges to
0 as transaction cost tends to 0.
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The local equilibrium in structure D1 is:
w is given by
f = abM1-(1-a)wM2-abt1r/(1-r)w-1/(1-r)M1 + w-r/(1-r)[(1-a+ab)M2t1r/(1-r)+
(1-a)M2 t2-r/(1-r)-(1-a+ab)M2w-(1+r)/(1-r) t1r/(1-r)t2-r/(1-r)] = 0















n1 = [abM1-(1-a)wM2](1-r)/a, n2 = (1-a+ab)M2(1-r)/a,
u1 = [q(1-a)]1-aaap1y-a, u2 = (1-a)1-aaa (p2y/w)-a.
where A º (1-b)b-1ab[a/(1-r)b]b/r[(1-r)b/ar]b. The market clearing conditions for intermediate





The local equilibrium in structure D2 is symmetric to that in D1. Marginal comparative
statics in structure D1 or D2 are similar to that in D0.
2.9. Local equilibrium in structure E
The local equilibrium in structure E1 is:
w = p2z = t1
r, p1z = 1/q, p1x =b/r, p2x = wb/r,
p1y = (1-b)b-1b-b/r(b/r)b[(1-r)a(M1 +M2t1r)/a]-b(1-r)/r
p2y = (1-b)b-1b-b (b/r)b[(1-r)aM2/a]-b(1-r)/r
n1 = [abM1-(1-b)a t1rM2](1-r)/a, n2 = aM2(1-r)/a,
u1 = q1-aB(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/r u2 = B(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/rk2at1ar.
where B º aa(1-a)1-a [(1-b)1-b(r/b)bbb/r]a[a(1-r)/a]ab (1-r)/r. The marginal comparative statics in
this structure are
(6) dui/dMi > 0, dui/dMj > 0, dui/dt1 > 0, du2/dk2 > 0
dni/dMi > 0, dn1/dM2 < 0, dn1/dt1 < 0.
The local equilibrium in structure E2 is symmetric to that in E1. The marginal comparative statics
in the two structures are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3:
As transaction efficiency and population size increases in either country, per capita real incomes in
both countries increase. The number of intermediate goods produced in a country increases with
the population size in this country. The number of intermediate goods produced by the country
importing intermediate goods decreases with the population size in the other country and with the
transaction efficiency coefficient in this country.
2.10. Local equilibrium in structure F
The local equilibrium in structure F1 and its marginal comparative statics are:
(7) w = p2z = t1
r, p1z = 1/q, p1x =b/r, p2x = wb/r,
p1y = (1-b)b-1(b/r)bb-b/r[(1-r)a(M1+t1rM2)/a]
p2y =  (1-b)b-1b-b (b/r)b[(1-r)M2/a]-b(1-r)/r
n1 = [abM1-(1-ab)t1rM2](1-r)/a, n2 = M2(1-r)/a,
u1 = q1-aB(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/r, u2 = B(M1+t1rM2)ab(1-r)/rt1rk2.
dui/dMi > 0, dui/dt1 > 0, du2/dk2 > 0
dni/dMi > 0, dn1/dM2 < 0, dn1/dt1 < 0.
where B º aa(1-a)1-a [(1-b)1-b(r/b)bbb/r]a[a(1-r)/a]ab (1-r)/r.
The local equilibrium in structure F2 is symmetric to that in F1. The marginal comparative
statics in the two structures are consistent with proposition 3.
3. General Equilibrium and Inframarginal Comparative Statics
Inserting the local equilibrium values of prices into (2), we can partition the parameter space of
twelve dimensions (q, b, a, r, M1, M2, a, b, t1, t2, k1, k2) into subspaces, within each of which a
local equilibrium is the general equilibrium. This analysis needs the equilibrium value of domestic
price of some good in a country which does not produce this good in some structure. But we can
calculate the shadow price of this good in this country from the first order condition of a firm,
assuming that this firm is active in producing this good. This analysis yields the following
inframarginal comparative statics of general equilibrium.
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(8a) The local equilibrium in structure A is the general equilibrium if either k1 and t1 or  k2 and t2
are sufficiently small.
(8b) Suppose that M1 is not too small compared to M2 and that k2 and t1 are not too small.
(8b-I) the local equilibrium in structure C1 is the general equilibrium if t1
r < k1/q.
(8b-II) the local equilibrium in structure E1 is the general equilibrium if t1
r Î(k1/q, 1/qk2).
(8b-III) the local equilibrium in structure F1 is the general equilibrium if t1
r >1/qk2.
(8c) Suppose that M1 is close to M2 and t1 is close to t2.
(8c-I) the local equilibrium in structure D0 is the general equilibrium
if k1 < qt1r and k2 < t2r/q
(8c-II) the local equilibrium in structure D1 is the general equilibrium if k2 > 1/qt1r.
(8c-III) the local equilibrium in structure D2 is the general equilibrium if k1 > q/t2r.
(8d) Suppose that M2 is not too small compared to M1 and that t2 and k1 are not too small.
(8d-I) the local equilibrium in structure C2 is the general equilibrium if t2
r < qk2
(8d-II) the local equilibrium in structure E2 is the general equilibrium if t2
rÎ(qk2, q/k1).
(8d-III) the local equilibrium in structure F2 is the general equilibrium if t2
r > q/k1.
Here, we have used the upper and lower bound of the local equilibrium value of w to find sufficient
conditions for Di to occur in equilibrium since the local equilibrium value of w in Di cannot be
solved analytically. But these conditions may not be necessary. Hence, the parameter subspace (8c)
is not completely partitioned.
In words, the inframarginal comparative statics state that three factors determine trade
patterns: exogenous technological comparative advantage (its degree is represented by q);
endogenous comparative advantage (its degree is represented by 1/r, r ciprocal of elasticity of
substitution); exogenous comparative advantages in transactions which relate to relative transaction
efficiencies of final and intermediate goods in country 1 compared to that in country 2 (ki/kj, ti/tj,
ki/ti, kj/tj) and absolute level of transaction efficiency.
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If the absolute level of transaction efficiency is low for all goods, autarky is equilibrium. As
transaction efficiency is improved, the general equilibrium jumps from autarky to a structure with
trade. It is the interplay between exogenous and endogenous comparative advantage in production
and transactions that determines to which structure the equilibrium will jump.
In order to understand the complicated comparative statics, we take a three-step analysis.
We first consider inframarginal analysis between structures, then marginal analysis for each
structure. For inframarginal analysis, we first compare between cases (8b), (8c), and (8d), then
compare between different structures in each case. The comparison between the cases indicates
that when transaction conditions of intermediate goods are similar in the two countries, each
country exports and imports intermediate goods. That is, a structure D occurs in equilibrium.
Otherwise, the country with the better transaction condition of intermediate goods imports such
goods. This is case (8b) or (8d). Case (8b) in which only country 1 imports intermediate goods, is
more likely to occur in equilibrium than case (8d) in which country 2 imports intermediate goods,
if the transaction efficiency of intermediate goods relative to that of final goods is higher in country
1 than in country 2 and/or if the population size in country 1 is larger.
We now take the second step. We consider case (8b) first. Suppose that the transaction
condition and exogenous comparative advantage change in the following way. k1 decreases nd/or
k2 increases, and/or q (degree of exogenous comparative advantage) increases, and t1 incr ases
over three periods of time. Hence, in period 1 k1> t1
r/q, which implies that country 1's transaction
efficiency of final goods is high, its transaction efficiency of intermediate goods is low, and
exogenous comparative advantage is not significant. Hence, the local equilibrium in structure C1 is
the general equilibrium (see (8b-I). In this structure, country 1 imports z and x and country 2
imports y. Then, these parameters change: k1 decreases, q increases, and/or t1r  increases, such that
in period 2, t1
rk2q > 1 > t1rk1q.  Hence, the equilibrium jumps to structure E1 wher  country 1 no
longer imports the final good z. In period 3, k2 ncreases, and/or t1
r, q further increase, such that
k2qt1r > 1. Then the equilibrium jumps to structure F1 where country 2 imports one more final
good z. This implies that as the degree of exogenous comparative advantage increases and as
country 2's relative transaction efficiency of importing final and intermediate goods increases
compared to that for country 1, the equilibrium trade pattern shifts as to increase country 2's
imported final goods compared to country 1. Also, the equilibrium trade pattern shifts from
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exporting goods with exogenous comparative disadvantage in production to exporting goods
with exogenous comparative advantage.
Repeating this analysis for other cases, we can obtain similar results. In summary, if
exogenous and endogenous comparative advantages in production and transactions go in the
same direction, then a country exports its comparative advantage goods. If it has endogenous
comparative in production and exogenous comparative advantage in transactions, but exogenous
comparative disadvantage in production for exporting a good, then it will export this good if the
advantage dominates the disadvantage. Otherwise, it imports this good. In other words, a country
exports a good with net comprehensive endogenous and exogenous comparative advantage in
production and transactions. It will use substitution between trade of different types of goods to
avoid trade with low transaction efficiency.
Put marginal comparative statics for structure C, given in (3), and inframarginal
comparative statics, given in (8), together, we can see that if the local equilibrium in structure C1 is
the general equilibrium, then the conditions for dn/dt1 > 0 and dn/ M1 > 0, given in (3), are
satisfied. Hence, dn/dt1 > 0 and dn/ M1 > 0 holds if structure C1 occurs in equilibrium. All
marginal and inframarginal comparative statics are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4:
(1) If transaction efficiencies for all goods are low, then autarky structure is equilibrium in which
no international trade occurs though the number of intermediate goods, productivity, and per capita
real income in each country increases with its population size. As transaction efficiency is
improved, the equilibrium jumps to a structure with trade. In an equilibrium trade pattern, a
country exports goods with net endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages in production
and transactions. It exports a good if its endogenous comparative advantage in production and
exogenous comparative advantage in transactions outweigh its exogenous comparative
disadvantage in producing this good. Otherwise, it imports this good. Each country will exploit the
substitution between trades of different types of goods to avoid trading goods that are associated
with low transaction efficiency.3
                                                          
3 The effects of transaction conditions on economic development are verified by historical evidences documented in
North (1958) and by empirical evidences provided in Barro (1997), Easton and Walker (1997), Frye and Shleifer
(1997), Gallup and Sachs (1998), Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997).
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(2) If a country exports the agricultural good and imports the final manufactured good (structure
C), as the transaction efficiency of intermediate goods in the other country increases from a very
low to a high level, this country shifts from specialization in producing the agricultural good to
exporting increasingly more intermediate goods. Changes in relative population size will shift the
production of producer goods to the country with increased relative population size. Improvements
in transaction conditions of final goods benefit both countries too. Improvements in transaction
conditions and increases in population size raise per capita real incomes in both country and the
total number of producer goods in the whole economy.
(3) If a country specializes in producing producer goods (structure E or F occurring in
equilibrium), an increase in population size and/or in transaction efficiency in either country raises
per capita real income. But an increase in a country's transaction efficiency or in the population
size in the other country will relocate the production of producer goods from the former country to
the latter.
(4) If the two countries trade producer goods (structure D occurring in equilibrium), then an
increase in the transaction efficiency in a country may reduce its per capita real income although
increases in population sizes may have positive effects on industrialization and per capital real
income. This implies that the government in each country may have an incentive to impose a tariff
(reduces transaction efficiency for importing goods) to improve terms of trade and raise home
residents' per capita real income.
4. Comparison with Conventional Wisdom based on the Models with CRS
In this section, we compare our analysis of pattern of trade and economic development with the
wisdom in the conventional theories of trade and economic development. We first compare our
theory with the core theorems of neoclassical trade theory and then compare it with neoclassical
development economics based on the models with constant returns to scale.
We first compare our results with the HO theorem. It is interesting to see that our
comparative statics may generate prediction that is empirically equivalent to rejecting the HO
theorem. If we interpret intermediate goods as capital or producer goods, then empirically, the
aggregate output level of intermediate goods in our model can be considered to be total value of
capital. With this interpretation, good y is capital intensive and z is labor intensive (which needs
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no capital goods for production). Hence, as the number of intermediate goods endogenously
increases in response to improvements of transaction condition or to population growth, capital
intensity of good y increases. There is no reason that the country producing a lot of capital goods
must export good y in our model. Hence, it is perfectly reasonable that from empirical
observation, a country producing a lot of capital goods exports labor intensive goods z and
imports capital intensive goods y. This analysis is consistent with the proposition made by
Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) that as increasing returns and intermediate goods are introduced,
the neoclassical core trade theorems may not hold.
Next, we compare our results with the SS theorem. Using the results in (3)-(7), it can be
shown that if structure C, E, or F occurs in equilibrium, we have
d(pix/wi)/dti = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dti < 0.
d(pix/wi)/dMi = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dMi < 0.
d(pix/wi)/dMj = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dMj < 0.
Also, if structure D occurs in equilibrium
d(pix/wi)/dtj = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dtj < 0.
d(pix/wi)/dMi = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dMi < 0.
d(pix/wi)/dMj = 0 and d(piy/piz)/dMj < 0.
All of these marginal comparative statics imply that as relative prices of goods and inputs change
in response to changes in parameters, the direction of the changes of relative prices are
inconsistent with the SS theorem. In other words, the final manufactured good y is capital
intensive and the agricultural good is labor intensive. As relative price of the two final goods
decreases in response to changes of transaction conditions, the relative price of capital goods to
labor does not change.
It is well known that the SS theorem does not hold out of the diversification cone. Hene,
if we consider inframarginal comparative statics that involve discontinuous jumps of equilibrium
across structures, then the SS theorem can be easily invalidated. This is consistent with a well-
known anything possible theorem about equilibrium comparative statics proved by Sonnenschein
(1973), Mantel (1974), and Debreu (1974).
The SS theorem has been used to show that tariff can be used to redistribute income
toward the scarce factor. But the common sense is inconsistent with the logic of the SS theorem.
The common sense says that as tariff increases in a country that exports capital intensive goods
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and imports labor intensive goods, labor will marginally benefit. But this tariff forgone
opportunity to increase productivity by expanding trade network. Hence, it is the net effect that
determines if labor can benefit from the increased tariff.
Our model substantiates this common sense. From (8b), we can see that if k2 d t1 are
large, structure C1 occurs in equilibrium. Assume that country 1 is the US and country 2 is
Taiwan. Now the government in the US increases import tariff rate, so that t1 decreases. I s
inframarginal effect is to make the equilibrium jump to autarky. From (2) and the local
equilibrium in autarky, we can see that the relative wage rate of the US to Taiwan is 1/t1
r>1 in
C1, and is 1 in autarky. Hence, inframartinal effect of the tariff increase is to reduce relative wage
of the US. But marginal effect of a decrease in t1 is to raise the relative wage rate in the US since
d(1/w) = d(1/t1
r)/dt1 < 0. Also, from (2), the terms of trade of the US p1y/p2z marginally increases
as t1 decreases (or tariff rate in the US increases). These are positive marginal effect of this tariff
increase on terms of trade and wage rate in the US. But it generates negative marginal effect by
reducing trade and productivity gains that can be exploited. The net marginal effect of this tariff
increase is represented by resulting changes in per capita real incomes (equilibrium utility). From
(2) and (3), it is obvious, this net marginal effect is negative since per capita real income
decreases as a result of the tariff increase in the US (du1/dt1, du2/dt1 > 0). If we take into account
of the negative inframarginal effect of the tariff increase which reduces the relative wage rate of
the US, the total net effect of the tariff increase is to hurt labor in the US. We have conducted
similar analysis for other structures C, E, F and obtained similar results.
It is interesting to see that in this example, labor in the US benefits from a decrease in
tariff rate, even if this tariff reduction marginally deteriorates US’s terms of trade. This is
because productivity gains from expanded network size of trade (an increase in the number of
traded intermediate goods n) may outweigh the negative effect of deteriorated terms of trade.4
But the analysis of structure D indicates that the net marginal effect of a tariff increase in
the US is positive (u1 increases as t1 decreases), though it marginally deteriorates terms of trade
p1x/p2x and relative wage 1/w. But total net marginal and inframarginal effect could be still
negative.
It is straightforward from the local equilibria in C, D, E, and F, that the factor price
equalization does not hold in general since the equilibrium value of w is not 1 in general, though
                                                          
4 Empirical evidence to support this prediction can be found from Sen (1998).
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it tends to 1 as transaction cost goes to 0. Hence, transaction costs explain the difference in factor
prices between the countries. As transaction conditions are improved, the factor price tends to be
equal for a given structure. A generalized FPE theorem may then be considered that as
transaction conditions are improved, factor prices tend to be equalized. But inframarginal
comparative statics (jumps of equilibrium between structures) will invalidate the generalized
FPE theorem. For instance, as k2 increases, the equilibrium may jump from D0 to C1, which may
cause an increase in the difference in wage rates between the two countries.
It is easy to see that the RY theorem may not hold in our model. But it is not appropriate
to directly compare our comparative statics with the core trade theorems in the HO model
because of different specifications of model structures. Hence, we should pay more attention to
the distinct features of comparative statics of our model which are summarized in propositions 1-
4. The effects of changes in transaction conditions on the number of traded goods and
intermediate goods (degree of industrialization), productivity, and per capita real income and on
discontinuous jumps of trade patterns are much more important than their effects on structure of
relative prices. No much regularity of comparative statics that relate to changes of structure of
relative prices stands out in general in our model. Anything is possible even if a specific model is
explicitly specified. The regularity of comparative statics that relates to price structure is not only
model specific, but also trade structure specific (or parameter subspace specific). Hence, it is
inconsequential to try finding the counterparts of the SS theorem and RY theorem in our model.
We now consider comparison between our comparative statics and conventional wisdom in
development economics. We first consider the development trap, then the relationship between
industrialization, income distribution, and evolution of dual structure, and finally development
strategy.
Assume that food z is a necessity and its minimum per capita consumption must be not
smaller than 1 for subsistence. Suppose all labor is allocated to the production of z. Then per
capita output and therefore per capita consumption of z is qi, which is not greater than 1 if and
only if qi £ 1. Hence, for a value of qi that is small enough to be close to 1, the equilibrium
number of intermediate goods must be at its minimum value 1. In other words, each intermediate
good is not necessity individually for the production of the final manufactured good y and
therefore labor must be concentrated in the production of food rather than dispersed in producing
many intermediate goods if productivity of food is very low. If transaction efficiency for
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international trade is very low too, then importing food is not an optimum choice. Therefore, a
country with very low transaction efficiency and low productivity of the agricultural goods will
be locked in the development trap where the number of available producer goods is very small,
productivity of the final manufactured goods is low, and trade dependence and per capita income
is low.
It is not difficult to show that as transaction conditions are improved, the relative output of
industrial goods x and y to the agricultural good z increases though the income share of industrial
goods is always a constant regardless of the degree of industrialization (an increase in the number
of intermediate goods and a decrease of price of final manufactured goods). As industrialization
continues, changes in the difference in per capita real income between countries has no much
general regularity.
Suppose structure C1 occurs in equilibrium, then from (2) and (3), we can see that per
capita real income in country 1 is higher than in country 2 if and only if (qk1)1-at11-r-a > (k2t2)a.
Suppose this inequality holds, the difference in per capita real income between the two countries
increases with q and k1, and decreases with k2 and a. Its relationship with t1 is ambiguous. Hence,
there are many determinants of the relationship between trade and inequality of income distribution
between countries. Suppose industrialization and increases in trade are driven by improvements in
transaction conditions. Relative change speed of transaction conditions in the two countries affects
changes in the difference in per capita real income between the two countries. There is no
monotonic correlation, nor simple inverted U curve between the difference and trade, which
increases with transaction efficiency and concurs with industrialization. If marginal comparative
statics in other structures and inframarginal comparative statics are considered, our conclusion will
be strengthened: no much general regularity of the relationship between inequality and economic
development and related trade exists. This prediction is supported by recent empirical evidences in
Ram (1997), which rejects inverted U curve for the relationship between inequality and per
capita income, and in Jones (1998, p. 65) which shows that the ratio of GDP per worker in the
5th-richest country to GDP per worker in the 5th-poorest country fluctuated from 1960 to 1990.
This result differentiates our model from the Krugman and Venables (1995) which predicts an
inverted U-curve.
We now consider the implications of our comparative statics for development strategies.
Again, we may take country 1 as the US and country 2 as Taiwan. Suppose that transaction
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efficiency for international trade in the initial period of time is very low in both countries, then
autarky occurs in equilibrium. Assume further that the US has a quite large autarky equilibrium
number of intermediate goods (quite high degree of industrialization) due to the relatively large
population size and Taiwan is in the development trap. We consider the two cases. In case (a),
Taiwan is in the development trap due to low relative productivity of the agricultural sector (bad
climate condition and limited arable land). In case (b) Taiwan’s relative productivity of the
agricultural sector is high, but its population size is too small.
Assume that in period 2, transaction efficiency for international trade is slightly improved.
The equilibrium will jump to structure F1 for case (a) since (8a) and (8b-III) indicate that for a
large q (country 2’s relative productivity of the agricultural good is low), as transaction conditions
are slightly improved, the equilibrium jumps from autarky to F1. For case (b), as transaction
conditions are improved, the equilibrium jumps from autarky to structure C1 since (8b-I) indicates
that for a small q (country 2’s relative productivity of the agricultural good is high), structure C1 is
more likely to occur in equilibrium. Suppose that the slight improvement of transaction condition
is not enough to ensure t1 > ta, so that n2 = 0 as shown in (4). This implies that Taiwan completely
specializes in producing and exporting the agricultural good (without industrialization) though it
can gain from exogenous comparative advantage in production.
In period 3, Taiwan has several options, dependent on the transaction cost coefficient or
tariff rate in the US (1-t1). Suppose 1-t  decreases over time due to liberalization reforms or
preferential tariff rate to Taiwan in the US. Then Taiwan starts industrialization. The production of
intermediate goods relocates from the US to Taiwan, increasing per capita real incomes in both
countries and the relative wage rate in Taiwan (see (3) and (4)). This shifts from C1 with a mall n2
to C1 with a large n2 looks like an export oriented development pattern, pursued by Taiwan in the
1960s - 1980s. The driving forces of this industrialization are the open door policy of the US (an
increase in t1 and k1, see (3) and (8b-I)) and Taiwan’s liberalization and internalization policy (a
large k2, see (8b)). In the literature of development economics, structure C1 wi h a small n2 is
sometimes called development pattern of dependence (see Myrdal, 1957, Nelson, 1956, Palma,
1978, for instance).
But if k2 is small compared to t1 and t2 because of a high tariff of imported final goods and a
low tariff of imported producer goods in Taiwan, then the equilibrium will jump from C1 with a
small n2 to D0 as Taiwan lows its import tariff of producer goods. This policy regime is just like the
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import substitution strategy carried out in Taiwan in the 1950s (see, for in tance, Balassa, 1980,
Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin, 1986, Meier, 1989, pp.297-306, and Bruton  1998). The jump
from C1 with a small n2 to D0 is just like an import substitution process. The difference between
export oriented and import substitution development patterns lies in the fact shown in propositions
1-4 that all countries have incentives to raise import tariff rates in structure D0 which will duce
per capita real incomes in both countries, while in structure C, E, or F, both countries have
incentives to reduce tariff rates.
In other words, if a government distorted tariff structure to pursue structure D (import
substitution), D itself will justify a more distorted tariff structure which impends economic
development. Hence, this distorted tariff policy could generate a particular type of development
trap. In the absence of such distorted tariff, structure D may occur naturally in equilibrium as a
consequence of certain patter of endogenous and exogenous comparative advantages in production
and transactions. Since utilities of both countries increase with transaction efficiencies in structures
C, E, and F, liberalization and internationalization policy is easier to carry out in these structures.
This explains why export oriented development pattern is more successful than the pattern of
import substitution. But the notion of import substitution is inaccurate, since this pattern of trade
and development relies on increases in imported intermediate goods, though it promotes domestic
production of final manufactured goods.
Another interesting difference in development patterns is between structure E1 or F1 and
structure E2. F1 is like that the less developed country (country 2) imports final goods and exports
parts and components of the final manufactured goods. Taiwan does not export automobiles but
exports a lot of parts and components of automobiles and computers. In structure E2, the less
developed country imports intermediate goods and exports final manufacture goods, similar to
Hong Kong’s development pattern in the 1970s and 1980s. However, if E1 or F2 occurs in
equilibrium in the absence of the government intervention, which of them takes place is
determined by natural endogenous and exogenous comparative advantage in production and
transactions. It is counter-productive to pursue a particular one of them by using tariff policy. Any
improvements in transaction efficiencies will promote productivity progress and increase per capita
real income, regardless which one among E and F occurs in equilibrium.
Following Yang and Heijdra's method (1992), we can show that all local equilibria may not
be Pareto optimal. Ignoring the conditions that marginal revenue equals marginal cost for firms
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producing intermediate goods, we can use all conditions for a local equilibrium in a structure to
express utilities as functions of n1 and n2. Maximizing utility of one country with respect to n1 and
n2 for a given value of utility of the other country yields the Pareto optimum n1 and n2, which may
be either greater or smaller than their local equilibrium values. Nobody gains from such distortions
caused by monopoly power and coordination problems of the industrial linkage network. Hence, a
cheap talk among members of an industrial association may reduce such distortions. Kemp (1995)
shows that if identical share holders’ decisions are spelt out in this kind of models, the distortions
caused by coordination problems can be avoided since consumers as shareholders do not gain from
such distortions while they suffer from them. In the presence of interest conflict between countries
which occurs in structure D when governments can manipulate transaction conditions via tariff
policies, the coordination difficulty cannot be solved via cheap talks. Hence, structure D (import
substitution pattern) cannot survive competition in the long-run if tariff policies are used to
manipulate terms of trade.
5. Concluding Remarks
We develop the model of monopolistic competition to provide a unified framework for the analysis
of patterns of trade and economic development. Coexistence of exogenous and endogenous
comparative advantages in production and differences in transaction conditions between countries
distinguishes our model from other models of monopolistic competition. Inframarginal
comparative statics distinguishes our results from marginal analyses of other models of
monopolistic competition. Our model shows that a country exports goods with net endogenous and
exogenous comparative advantage in production and transactions. It may export a good with
exogenous comparative disadvantage in production, if its endogenous comparative advantage in
producing this good and its comparative advantage in transactions dominate this disadvantage.
Decision makers will use substitution between trades of different types of goods to avoid trade
with high transaction costs.
Improvements in transaction conditions or increases in population sizes will promote
industrialization, increase productivity, per capita real incomes, and trade dependence. But
increases in the population size in a country may relocate the production of intermediate goods to
this country from the other country. In an asymmetric trade pattern which looks like an export
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oriented development pattern, improvements in transaction conditions in a country has positive
effects on per capita real incomes in all countries. But in a symmetric trade pattern which looks
like a development pattern of import substitution, a decrease in transaction efficiency in a country
may increase per capita real income in this country. This creates incentives for manipulating terms
of trade by imposing import tariff. This tariff war will impend economic development in all
countries.
No much general regularity exists for the relationship between inequality of income
distribution between countries and economic development and related trade, nor for the
relationship between relative prices of goods and relative prices of inputs.
The shortcoming of this model is that it predicts two types of scale effects. Type I scale
effect implies that industrialization, economic development, and trade will be promoted by an
increase in population size in the whole economy. The scale effect is rejected by empirical
evidences surveyed in National Research Council (1986) and Dasgupta (1995). Also, our model
generates Type II scale effect which implies that productivity of manufactured goods goes up if
and only if the average size of the manufacturing firms increases. The scale effect is rejected by
empirical evidence provided by Liu and Yang (1999). There are two ways to avoid the scale
effects. One is to specify local economies of scale. This makes the algebra very complicated due to
feedback loops between positive profit and consumers' demand functions. The other way is to
develop the models with endogenous individuals’ levels of specialization (Sun and Lio, 1997,
Yang and Ng, 1995, Shi and Yang, 1995, and Liu and Yang, 1999). These models of endogenous
specialization formalize the argument of irrelevance of the size of the firm, proposed by Coase
(1937), Cheung (1983), Stigler (1953), and Young (1928). According to this argument, if division
of labor develops between firms, productivity increases while average size of firms declines
(outsourcing, contracting out, disintegration, focusing on core competence). If division of labor
develops within each firm, then the average size of firms and productivity increase simultaneously.
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